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


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
KINGSTON ONTARIO CANADA

Ca. 1720?



T H E
INFALLIBILITY
O F T H E
King of ENGLAND
A S S E R T E D,
A N D

The BLESSED EFFECTS thereof
plainly demonstrated.



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THE
 INFALLIBILITY
 OF THE
 King of England
 ASSERTED, &c.

THERE is not a Maxim in our Government more generally repeated and understood, than, *That the King of England can do no Wrong*. I own myself singular enough to admit this Maxim in a very limited Sense, nor am I at all satisfied that it is founded in our Constitution. Water cannot intoxicate; but if Water has Brandy added to it, it may — *The King of England can do no Wrong*, but if the King of England has another Character added to that of King of England, as different in its Nature as Brandy is from Water, the

the King and the *** together *may do Wrong*, nay, *very wrong*——Our Ancestors thought so——They thought that while their Princes were *Sovereigns in Power HERE*, and Dependents for Territory *ABROAD*, that they *might*, nay, that they very often *DID, do Wrong*——Hence arose the coercive Provision in *Magna Charta*, (I mean the true *Magna Charta* of King *John*, and not that tame Thing inserted in our Law Books) by which the Barons of *England* not only suppose that the King *may do Wrong*, but that *he has done Wrong*; they provide proper Remedies, nay, adequate Punishments for *that Wrong*, upon the King himself——They saw that the King was totally engrossed by his Passion for his foreign Dominions; they perceived that this was a Vortex, in which the Treasure, the Blood, the Trade and Honour of *England* would soon be swallowed up; they saw that while this Passion continued, he disregarded the Remonstrances of all *Englishmen*; they saw that they thereby lost the Safety which the above Maxim gives to the People, by leaving them a Recourse against the Ministry; they therefore considered this Maxim as totally superseded, in a Case wherein their Sovereign looked upon himself as a *foreign Prince* rather than an *English King*.

There is, as I am told, a Term in the *Scotch* Law, made use of in their Acts, and applied to King *James* at the late Revolution, which gives us a very strong Idea of a King, who, without being chased, runs away from his regal Dominions. The Term is, if I am rightly informed, *FOREHUING the Kingdom*; and is a Metaphor taken from a Bird who abandons her *Nest*, and her young Ones, without being forced away. The *English* and the *Scots* acted, upon that important Occasion, very differently; the former spent whole Days, nay Weeks, in a paltry insignificant Debate about the Importance of the Word: *Abdicated*; but the *Scots* very roundly voted, that the King had *forfeited the Crown*, and that he had *FOREHUED* the Kingdom. It was indeed some Comfort to both Nations,

tions, that he never returned ; and the *English* were so sensible of the bad Consequences of this FOREHUING the Kingdom, that one of the Provisions in the Act of Settlement, was against the King of *England* leaving his regal Dominions without Consent of Parliament.

His present M——y is not only under a *political* but a *natural* Incapacity of *doing Wrong* ; and such are his royal Abilities as well as Virtues, that I believe it is the only Thing of which he is not capable. He is incapable of *doing Wrong* not more from the Constitution of the Kingdom, than of his own *Person*, which renders every Precaution taken by the People against his Predecessors needless as to him. But it appears from the Instance I have already brought, that not only we, but our Neighbours *once* imagined, that a King *might do Wrong* in throwing up the Reins of Government ; in abandoning the Seat of Majesty, to gratify a ruling Passion, no Matter from what Motive, whether of Pleasure, Ambition, Love or Fear.

When publick Commotions, far less when *publick Calamity*, threatens the Peace of his People, a King of *England* ought to keep his Seat of Government the more firm the more it is shaken ; he ought more strongly to grasp the *Sceptre* the more it trembles in his Hand. Such were the Sentiments of our *Patriots* at the Revolution. They found that King *James* had done Wrong by *abdicating* the Throne ; even the *Dutch* Guards were ordered to take Post round his royal Palace. The *English* could not endure a King who could thus fear for his own Person, far less for his own Interest ; they found he had *abdicated*, that is, he had *done Wrong* ; they censured, they punished him *for that Wrong* ; his Seat was declared vacant, and another took his Office.

But this Case might have received many Aggravations in the Persons either of King *James* or his Brother. Supposing

posing one of them had managed Parties ill at Home and Matters worse abroad, so that he had been forced to put his *Civil Affairs* into the Hands of a *motly Ministry*, and his *Military* under the Direction of a *foreign General*—— Supposing that a publick Calamity had overtaken the Nation, and that, in this melancholy State of Things the K——g and his W—— had marched off, and that he had been so wholly engrossed by his Passion for her, and for *foreign Dominions*, that he had disregarded the Remonstrances of all his M——y, which AGREED in nothing but in their Intreaties to keep him at Home. Supposing that, like a Dog who had broke from his Halter, he had been afraid of even looking back upon the Place of his Prison, as he thought this *Island* to be. I say, supposing all this, can we suppose such a *King* to have done *no Wrong*.

But I hate *masqued Batteries*, ever since the Damage they did to our Troops at *Tournay*; all the Suppositions I have made are therefore chimerical, and without Regard, not only to actual, but to possible Events. All I mean is, to set the Publick in the Right as to this important Maxim——*The King can do no Wrong*; but why? *Because the Ministry is answerable for all he does amiss*. This, we are told, is a Fundamental in our present Constitution. I don't dispute it, more than I would his M——y's Title against *Dimmock*, when he throws down his *Gauntlet*. All I say is, that a Case may be supposed to have happened before the Revolution, in which *the King might have done Wrong*, and yet it would have been unjust to punish *the Ministry for that Wrong*. In such a Case, to such a King, the Ministry may say as *Cicero* says to *Cæsar*, *Sociam habes neminem. Totum hoc quantum cunq; est, quod certe maximam est, totum est inquam tuum*——But even in such a Case, tho' the Ministry may not be liable for the King's Behaviour, yet they are for his *Conduct*; that is, tho' they cannot stop the impetuous Whirl of his Passion for his *foreign Concerns*, yet they ought either to *lay down*, or be answerable for the Consequences: In short, if they continue

tinue in Place, they should take care *that the Republick should receive no Detriment. Ne quid detrimenti Respublica capiat.*

The People of *England*, while they understood their own Interests, have never admitted it as an Excuse, when a M——r has told them, that he was but a single Voice; that he was always against such and such Measures. For, in all decisive Cases, the Act of the Whole is the Act of every Individual, especially when no Dissent is admitted to be *entred*. Could we, to continue our Suppositions, suppose a Reign so infamous in the *English Annals*, as that the Pursuit of a foreign Interest is the avowed, the unvarying Measure of the Government: That this Interest is so dear to the Prince, that it is the Standard by which he weighs all Merit, Civil or Military: That Opposition to it is the Method by which Men *get Places*, and Compliance with it the Means by which *they keep them*: That this Measure has involved the Nation in a cruel, bloody, expensive and unnecessary War: That our Allies are so lavish of *English Lives*, that they cannot be convinced we can be in Earnest, before we are obliged to act some mad Attempt, where Success is impracticable, and the Death of Thousands certain: That the General of our chief Ally, with this View, contrary to his own Conviction, contrary to ocular Demonstration, contrary to repeated Remonstrances, resolved upon this desperate romantick Attack, from this wicked mercenary View: That the Consequence is, our Soldiers are not *killed* but SLAUGHTERED, while not a single Man of the Army of this Ally is exposed, or so much as in the Field: That the Valour of the *English* serves to make their Destruction more certain. Let us suppose farther, that all this is undeniable, nay, admitted on all Hands; supposing, I say, all this, will a M——ry be held blameless, nay, will they not be held in eternal Detestation, who shall not only

only defend, but pursue, the Measures which have entailed all those Miseries upon us.

Is not the Loss of our Trade, the Waste of our Treasure, the Ruin of our Interest, sufficient to convince the World of our Sincerity, without the *wanton spilling of our Blood*? Will an Age, in which all this may be supposed to have happened, enquire which of the Ministers were for or against those infamous Measures? No, nothing appears by which it can be known any one of them opposed them; and nothing can appear but by that only Test of true Wisdom and Patriotism in wicked degenerate Times; I mean a RESIGNATION, and making a *private* Station the Port of Honour.

F I N I S.





